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This paper sets forth a framework of analysis that links contractual, discretionary, 
regulatory and residual cash flows with decision rights over them. To attain this 
purpose,  firstly  we  introduce  the  standard  incremental  cash  flow  model, 
underlying its main limitations. Secondly, we move on bringing to light cash flows 
to  senior  management  and  directors,  as  well  as  the  so-often  neglected 
investment  portfolio.  Next,  we  settle  down  to  what  we  are  going  to  call  the 
compact  cash  flow  model  that  comprises  five  building  blocks,  namely  those 
arising  out  of  assets,  those  addressed  to  owners,  creditors,  managers  and 
directors, and lastly the company’s investment portfolio. Afterwards, contractual, 
discretionary, regulatory and residual cash flows are enlarged upon. Last of all, 
we focus on decision rights over every constituent of each building block. This 
issue carries weight in Corporate Governance since stakeholders who claim or 
exercise decision rights, also could trespass on the rules of the game, becoming 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate  Governance  has  been  profiting  from  contributions  stemming  from 
many  quarters:  law  and  economics,  sociology,  financial  economics  and 
Corporate Finance. In the latter field we find out seminal papers written, among 
others, by Fama and Jensen (1983), Jensen (1986), Jensen and Smith (1985), 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), that focused on residual cash flows and property 
rights, providing noticeable insights to deal with agency problems that arise out of 
stakeholders’ relationships in any organization. Following this line of enquiry, and 
taking advantage of the cash-flow model, research on conflicts of interests, rent-
seeking and soft-budget constraint has been carried out by Apreda (1999, 2001, 
2002b, 2003, 2005b). 
 
Our contention in this paper is that there are at least four relevant and distinctive 
cash-flow categories. Namely contractual, regulatory, discretional and residual, 
that come in handy to understand many Corporate Governance issues
1, as soon 
as we ask to ourselves about the linkage between constituents of each category 
and the major claimers of decision rights. 
 
In section 1, we deal with the structure of expected incremental cash flows by 
highlighting  their  fixed,  variable  and  contingent  features.  Finally,  we  brief  the 
conventional incremental cash flow model (ICFM).  
 
Section  2  introduces  the  compact  model  of  incremental  cash  flows,  which 
enlarges the ICFM. Keeping such line of argument, we focus on the main players 
in  the  contest  and  allocation  of  cash  flows:  owners,  directors,  managers  and 
creditors. Secondly, the investment portfolio of any company, which has been 
neglected so far, is shown as a stand-alone category of cash flows. Lastly, the 
compact model turns out to be a construct of five building blocks of cash flows, 
namely those from assets, towards creditors, owners, managers and directors, 
and the investment portfolio. 
 
It is for section 3 to expand on contractual cash flows, while sections 4, 5 and 6 
handle regulatory, discretionary and residual cash flows, respectively. Last of all, 
in section 7, we raise the question of who can claim decision rights over each 
constituent cash flow in the compact model. Ultimate power on cash flows may 
nurture opportunistic behavior  with  guile, bringing about damage and material 
losses to those stakeholders who fail to forestall and contend for any deviant 
usage of such power.   
 
 
1.  THE STRUCTURE OF EXPECTED INCREMENTAL CASH FLOWS 
 
Let us assume we have defined a planning horizon  
 
                                                 
1 On the semantics of Corporate Governance, see Apreda (2005a).   4 
H  =  [ t ; T ] 
 
spanning from starting date at t, through ending date T. At the starting date, we 
have to assess certain incremental cash flow, D D D DCF( . ; t ), where the dot between 
brackets  stands  for  the  particular  variable  which  we  are  interested  in.  For 
example, let us take the variable “creditors”, which leads to D D D DCF( creditors ; t ). 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  is  a  building  block  consisting  of  interest  payments, 
principal redemption, debt repurchase, and new debt issues, as we are going to 
develop in section 1.2. 
 
Why do we busy ourselves with incremental cash flows instead of plain cash 
flows outright? Because we are interested in cash flows attributable only as from 
date t and that had not existed before
2.   
 
1.1  THE THREE-TIERED STRUCTURE OF CASH FLOWS 
 
For  the  assessment of  incremental  cash flows,  we  have  to  take  into  account 
three distinctive components: fixed, variable, and contingent ones. 
 
Any time that the analyst attempts to work out cash flows, and regardless of the 
fact that they could carry on either fixed, variable, or contingent features, she 
must bear in mind that, whereas a few of them are deterministic, the most have a 
random nature. If the valuation occurs at the starting date of the planning horizon 
H, in almost all cases the assessment only gives an expected value. However, at 




When itemizing those cash-flow components, it must be stressed that the more 
contractual they are, the more deterministic they become. In the opposite side, 
residual cash flows are basically stochastic as a whole. 
 
a)  Fixed component 
 
It is the case of depreciation schedules for fixed assets, as well as contractually-
fixed salaries
4 to be paid along the planning horizon. We have to charge them, 
irrespective  of  the  company’s  performance.  Another  example  is  provided  by 
those credits whose interest payments must be disbursed following a fixed-rate 
procedure.  
 
                                                 
2 By the way, this is the criterion widely used in capital budgeting and other valuation settings in 
Corporate Finance: regard as such only cash flows that are brought about by the project out of 
which they fail to take place. 
3 Bear in mind that after date T some correction or adjustments could follow on accountancy 
grounds and as a matter of fact. That is the rationale behind the expression “the information is 
fairly reliable, and seldom random”.  
4 Exclusive of variable components, by all means.   5 
b)  Variable component 
 
The variable component of any cash flow measures up an amount of money that 
depends  either  on  quantities,  volume,  or  the  ups  and  downs  of  a  suitable 
benchmark.  
 
The  more  we  sell  of  a  certain  good  or  service,  larger  cash  flows  will  be 
associated with revenues, but also with costs. For these transactions the analyst 
counts either the units, or records the volume sold
5. 
 
When  the  assessment  is  linked  to  the  performance  of  a  chosen  index  that 
increases or decreases along the horizon H, we also face a variable amount of 
cash inflows or outflows. For instance, and coming back to our former example 
based  on  cash  flows  to  creditors,  D D D DCF(  creditors  ),  let  us  assume  that  a 
particular  creditor  (a  bondholder  or  a  financial  institution)  agrees  with  the 
company to receive interest payments that will follow a floating-rate pattern, that 
consists in a rate chosen as benchmark to figure out the amount of interest to be 
paid 
6, which will likely be different period after period.  
 
c)  Contingent component 
 
This component hinges upon an underlying set of states of nature, each of them 
triggering off a different value. More precisely, given a set of predictable states or 
conditions, K 1 , K 2 ,, K 3 , … , K N ,  if  state or condition K r arises, then a well-
defined cash flow 
 
D D D DCF( . ; t ; K r ) 
 
will follow
7. The analyst must choose which is the most likely state to crop up, or 
ultimately resort to expected values of the whole arrangement. 
 
As an example drawn from the working capital structure, consider what a supplier 
charges the company for certain good on terms of quantity. Between x(1) and 
x(2) a price follows, but beyond x(2) and below x(3) another price, frequently less 
than the former will apply, and so on.  
 
Another example is provided by options-like rewards
8, which establish that below 
certain contractual amount of money, called the exercise price, there will be no 
cash  flows  springing  out  of  an  underlying  asset  (financial  or  non-financial). 
                                                 
5 Likewise, we can argue about  buying goods or services. 
6  For  example  the  Libor-180,  which  is  used  for  payments  along  semesters,  is  reset  at  the 
beginning of each semester on behalf of the current values available in the bond market, hence 
supplying with the accrual rate for the period.  
7 Non-finite sets comprising either states or conditions are out of the scope of this paper. 
8 In this context, the options refer to the purchase, not the selling, of something in the future.   6 
Instead, above the exercise price, it will be for the beneficiary to claim those cash 
flows in excess of such price
9.  
 
1.2  INCREMENTAL CASH FLOW MODEL 
 
The conventional setting for the incremental cash flow model
10 (as from now, the 
ICFM) runs as follows: 
(1) 
D D D D CF ( assets )   =   D D D D CF ( creditors )   +  D D D D CF ( owners ) 
 
To make this identity fully operational, we have to assume some qualifications 
about the internal structure of cash flows in the above identity: 
 
i)  D D D D CF ( assets )  
 
This building block is set up by detracting from total revenues the whole structure 
of costs (but for those related with medium- and long-term interest payments), as 
well as all provisions for working capital and non-current assets. 
 
Broadly  speaking,  we  have  to  regard  this  building  block  like  a  stand-alone 
expression that gives account of how much economic value the analyst expects 
to be created through the planning horizon. 
 
ii)  D D D D CF ( creditors )    
 
It comprises either interest payments (those which we did not take into account 




This  building  block  also  includes  new  debt  issues,  which  are  cash  flows  of 
opposite sign than the former ones; in fact, they are inflows to the company. The 
expression “creditors” mean here banks and bondholders (institutional investors 
mainly) alike.   
 
iii)  D D D D CF ( owners )  
 
It consists of dividend payments and early repurchase of equity, as well as new 
equity  issues  to  finance  the  company  (the  latter  convey  a  negative  sign,  in 
contrast with the two former cash flows that carries the positive sign).  
 
                                                 
9 In such setting, the beneficiary  pays the exercise price outright, and can get  the difference 
between the market price at that time with the exercise price.   
10 The appendix at the end of the paper furnishes with a minimal background about the ICFM. 
11 The treatment of interest payments in the ICFM carries on the following logic: if they stem from 
short-term liabilities cash flows are allocated above the EBIT line, whereas the interest accrued 
from medium-and long-term liabilities are kept in this building block.    7 
When the organization is a stock-company, we are going to speak about cash 
flows  to  shareholders.  Otherwise,  we  refer  to  cash  flows  to  equity-holders  or 
owners, briefly. 
 
1.3  A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE ICFM 
 
If we took the ICFM up to its ultimate consequences, then (1) would say that 
whatever the company creates ends up being distributed among creditors and 
equity-holders. But such behavior, systematically carried out period after period, 
would prevent the company from becoming sustainable and, even worse, from 
growing at all. 
 
Somebody  could  point  out  that  growth  opportunities  and  sustainability  are 
properly handled any time we design the provisions for non-current assets. But if 
such were the case, and from a corporate governance standpoint, we would be 
allowing three unwarranted developments: 
 
-  discretionary allocations of what are called agency-consumption goods; 
-  faltering accountability processes;  
-  and lacking in transparency. 
 




2.  THE CASH-FLOW COMPACT 
 
It is for the incremental cash flow model to meet two goals: 
 
￿  to track down value creation out of assets;  
￿  to figure out likely applications of such value to creditors and owners.  
 
Before using this model in Corporate Governance, however, we must sharpen it 
up, mainly by coping with two distinctive issues: 
 
–  to allow for the essential players enter the stage; 
–  to retrieve from oblivion the investment portfolio any company manages  in 
real life, as it were an internal mutual fund. 
 
THE ESSENTIAL PLAYERS 
 
The ICFM is predicated upon the next relationship:  
 
D D D D CF ( assets )   =   D D D D CF ( creditors )   +  D D D D CF ( owners ) 
   8 
which, however, does not bring to light the underlying cash flows to be claimed 
by two big players in the governance of any kind of organization, namely the 
senior management and the Board of Directors.  
 
Therefore, we have to modify the conventional model, by adding a new building 
block of cash flows as important as the ones related with creditors and equity-
holders as it is shown next: 
 (2) 
D D D D CF ( assets; net )   =   D D D D CF ( creditors )   +  D D D D CF ( owners )  +  
 
+    D D D D CF ( senior management and directors )   
 
Two qualifications are due here to ensure consistency in the former relationship: 
 
￿  Whereas  the  Earnings  and  Losses  Statement  do  contain  valuable 
information about the compensation package of managers and directors, it 
does not provide all the relevant information. Sometimes this is left to off-
sheet  remarks.  However,  there  is  wide-ranging  evidence  that  most 
companies  are  not  so  transparent  on  these  matters  as  would  be 
advisable.  All  in  all,  either  internal  or  external  analysts  could  reach 
satisfactory  albeit  incomplete  assessments  to  figure  out  this  kind  of 
incremental cash flows.  
 
￿  It goes without saying that cash flows generated by assets in (2) do not 
match the expression in (1). In fact, we have detracted from assets in (1) 
the compensation package of managers and directors in order to set up 
expression (2). However, we are going to drop the expression “net” when 
no confusion arises. 
 
THE INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO 
 
In current university textbooks, when the conventional ICFM is introduced, some 
simplifications are understandable for the sake of illustration (see, for instance, 
the book by Ross et al., 2005, chapter 2). In point of fact, when designing the 
provisions  for  non-current  assets  it  is  assumed  that  they  only  comprise  fixed 
assets,  in  utter  disregard  of  medium-  and  long-term  investments  in  financial 
assets. On the other hand, provisions for working capital frequently fail to include 
short-term  investments  in  financial  assets.  From  a  corporate  governance 
perspective, however, we cannot do without the investment portfolio built up out 
of those financial assets. Therefore, cash flows from this portfolio, which we are 
going to denote as   
 
D D D D CF ( investment portfolio ) 
 
will make for another building block, as it is shown in (3).  
   9 
Among medium- and long-term financial investment we can notice government 
bonds  and  notes,  corporate  stock  and  bonds,  financial  hybrids  (convertible 
bonds, convertible preferred stock, bonds with warrants), bank bonds. Short-term 
investment  mainly  consists  of  term-deposits  issued  by  banks,  Treasury  bills, 
commercial paper.  
 
Such portfolio fulfills two broad and essential objectives: 
 
￿  it performs as a provider of contingent liquidity;  
￿  it carries out the role of a sinking-fund through which the company expects 
to finance new growth opportunities
12. 
 
Those who handle this portfolio have to meet a fiduciary role. As a matter of fact, 
managers  and  directors  remain  accountable  for  their  fiduciary  duties  towards 
owners and the company. Whereas most of these fiduciary duties are explicitly 
disclosed in the founding charter (or across corporate and contract laws), this 
seems most regrettable, since no apparent monitoring or accountability methods 
constrain eventually the discretionary nature of these cash flows.  
    
THE CASH-FLOWS COMPACT 
 
After singling out both the compensation package and the investment portfolio, 




D D D DCF ( assets )   =   D D D DCF ( creditors )   +  D D D DCF ( owners )  +  
 
+    D D D DCF ( senior management and directors )  +  D D D DCF ( investment portfolio )   
 
It’s worth thinking this relationship a step further to make it operational, that is to 
say, to attach observable facts or procedures to the construct. In contradistinction 
with the right side of ICFM as portrayed in (1), now we get access to the main 
players in corporate governance: 
 
a)  equity holders, who bear residual rights and cash flows; 
 
b)  the Board and the senior management, whose fiduciary role entitles them, 
but  also  makes  them  accountable  to  owners  upon  discretionary  and 
residual cash flows; 
 
c)  creditors, whose claims are mostly contractual, regardless of how well or 
badly the company will perform along the planning horizon
14; 
                                                 
12 About sinking funds and their importance for Corporate Governance, see Apreda (2007b).  
13 The appendix at the end of this paper summarizes and contrast the standard with the compact 
models. 
14 To put it bluntly, non-compliance of debt commitments would trigger off default settings.     10 
d)  the  investment  portfolio,  which  comprises  discretionary  cash  flows 
mastered  by  managers  and  directors  in  disperse-ownership  structures, 
although in family-owned and closed companies it is for block-holders to 
rule over the investment strategy.    
 
In  section  7,  we  are  going  to  profit  from  a  different  standpoint  to  cope  with 
corporate governance matters.   
 
  
3.  CONTRACTUAL CASH FLOWS 
 
Companies engage in manifold transactions on repeated and persistent patterns 
of agreement with third parties, either as inputs, throughputs or outputs. In many 
cases, the underlying cash flows are set under clear and enforceable contracts. 
This calls for a definition
15. 
 
Definition 1  Contractual cash flows 
 
By  contractual  cash  flows  we  understand  those  that  meet  the  following 
restrictions: 
 
a)  their nature, size, timing, source  or destination are drawn up in a contract; 
 
b)  there is a mechanism to figure out these cash flows at the moment they 
will become either outflows or inflows; 
 
c)  in  most  cases,  information  about  the  binding  contract  belongs  to  the 
private domain; 
 
d)  counterparts  obligate  themselves  and  may  contest  each  other  bringing 
their case to court. 
 
There are plenty of examples of contractual cash flows placed above the EBIT 
line, as well as in the provisions for working capital, either those that involve 
goods sold to regular customers, for instance, or services rendered by suppliers 
of labor, technology, raw material, managerial skills, finished goods and the like.  
 
 
4.  REGULATORY CASH FLOWS 
 
This sort of cash flows are designed and enforced by the Government, either at 
federal, state or municipal levels; or by any regulatory agency legally entitled to 
request  cash  flows  from  companies  in  the  private  sector.  Transactional 
environments actually mean for the companies not only a collection of alternative 
                                                 
15 In this paper, definitions do not intend to give a crisp and definite meaning. They should be 
regarded as working statements for the sake of semantics.    11 
markets  where  inputs  and  outputs  are  regularly  traded,  but  also  regulatory 
environments that set the rules for companies to meet their distinctive goals. 
 
Definition 2  Regulatory cash flows 
 
By regulatory cash flows we  mean those that exhibit the following features: 
 
a)  their  nature,  size,  timing,  source  or  destination  are  established  by  the 
regulator; 
 
b)  there is a mandatory methodology to figure out the amount of cash flows 
to be delivered to the regulator as well the circumstances under which the 
company may claim some devolution if any; 
 
c)  information about the structure, deadlines, and constituents of these cash 
flows belongs to the public domain; 
 
d)  they  are  compulsorily  collected  and  the  regulator  is  able  to  impose 
sanctions whenever the company fails to meet its liabilities. 
 
Although most components of regulatory cash flows are fixed or variables, there 
is room for contingencies, as when we must give heed to alternative settings 
linked  with  likely  changes  in  the  methodology,  the  scaling  of  taxes,  or 
mechanisms  of  discount  that  brings  tax  relief  to  some  activities  with  social 
implications.  
 
    
5.  DISCRETIONARY CASH FLOWS 
 
The essential feature of these cash flows lies on the power of some decision-
makers within the company to carry out the following tasks: 
 
-  increase or decrease any budgeted cash flow; 
-  set up a new category of cash flow; 
-  leave out some existing category of cash flow; 
-  shift a proportion of certain cash flow to another one. 
 
Although  discretionary  power  over  cash  flows  is  essential  for  every  kind  of 
company, criteria for the allocation of cash flows may foster hidden agendas or 
self-dealing  transactions  from  three  main  players:  the  owners,  the  Board  of 
Directors, and the Senior Management. 
 
However,  we  have  to  bear  in  mind  that  if  financial  distress  threatened  the 
company’s survival, creditors should be added to the former list.  
 
   12 
Definition 3  Discretionary cash flows 
 
By  discretionary  cash  flows  we  understand  those  that  convey  the  following 
features: 
 
a)  their nature, size, timing, source or destination are brought into existence 
by owners, the Board of Directors, or the Senior Management; 
 
b)  there  is  an  internally  devised  methodology  to  work  out  the  amount  of 
inflows or outflows; 
 
c)  information usually belongs to the private domain; 
 
d)  the commitment and responsibility of the player who decides the scope 
and  range  of  these  cash  flows  should  depend  on  accountability 
mechanisms that the company’s governance had set forth in the founding 
charter or the governance bylaws of the organization. 
 
 
6.  RESIDUAL CASH FLOWS 
 
At the core of this concept we find the idea of a residual, which amounts to what 
remains  once  we  detract  from  revenues  all  the  relevant  costs  that  lead  to 
expected cash flows brought about by assets, along the span of time defined by 
the planning horizon. That is to say: 
 
D D D D CF ( assets )    =   EBIT  –  taxes  +  depreciation  – 
 
–  provisions  for working capital  –  provisions for non-current assets 
 
As many items among the categories of revenues and costs exhibit variable or 
contingent components, in fact stochastic ones, it follows that the net income 
also becomes stochastic and residual.  
 
Therefore, cash flows from assets are risky, because there will be a gap between 
their  assessment  at  date  t  and  their  historical  realization  at  time  T.  In  other 
words,  
(4) 
Residual risk from assets   =   E [D D D DCF( assets; t ) ]  –  D D D DCF( assets ; T )   ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹  0 
 
On the other hand, recalling (1), 
 
D D D D CF ( assets )   =   D D D D CF ( creditors )   +  D D D D CF ( owners ) 
 
and singling out cash flows directed to owners, we get 
   13 
(5) 
D D D D CF ( owners )   =   D D D D CF ( assets )   –  D D D D CF ( creditors ) 
 
As cash flows from assets are residual and risky, whereas cash flows to creditors 
hinge upon contractual performance and, therefore, they become less risky and 
more  deterministic,  the  difference  depicted  in  (5)  tells  us  that  cash  flows  to 




Definition 4  Residual cash flows  
 
By residual cash flows we refer to those conveying the following features: 
 
a)  their nature is established in terms of cash flows brought about from assets; 
 
b)  their structure comprises random cash flows as well as deterministic ones; 
 
c)  they are worked out by substracting taxes, provisions to working capital and 
to  non-current  assets  from  the  EBIT,  and  adding  non-cash  assets  like 
depreciation or amortization; 
 
d)  most  information  usually  belongs  to  the  private  domain,  but  external 
assessments are feasible from public information and the analyst appraisal of 
expected rates of change for relevant variables. 
 
In contradistinction, but building a bridge with this notion, some scholars have 
successfully  delved  into  residual  control  rights  (see,  for  instance,  Hart  and 
Moore, 1990; and also Zingales, 1997), which are those claimed by owners or 
the members of the Board whenever the founding charter or contracts do not 
provide  with  clear  answers  to  cope  with  material  decisions  arising  in  the  real 
world.  
  
If  we  now  make  the  contrast  between  an  ex~ante  (budgeted)  and  ex~post 
(historical)  assessment  of  cash flows  to  owners,  it follows  that  the  underlying 
residual risk can be formatted as 
(6) 
 
Residual risk to owners   =   E [D D D DCF( owners; t ) ]  –  D D D DCF( owners ; T )   ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹  0 
 
which tells us that owners ultimately bear the residual risk of cash flows entailed 
in (5). 
 
                                                 
16 We could have framed a broader definition, stressing the fact that any residual cash flow arises 
out of the difference between positive and negative cash flows. But such approach seems not 
essential to the scope of our research, by which its key point lies on revenues less costs, so that 
the residual cash flows stem from earnings before taxes and interest.    14 
As the owners are the ultimate bearers of the net income under the guise of 
dividends, they claim residual and risky cash flows, as Fama and Jensen (1983) 
so neatly stated in their paper. 
 
If we now recall that Hansmann (1996) defined ownership rights as those who 
entitle their recipients with 
 
￿  a claim to residual cash flows generated by the company, 
 
￿  and  control  rights,  mainly  through  the  exercise  of  voting  and  board 
composition, 
 
it couldn’t come as a surprise that residual cash flows had exhibited from the 
start such paramount status in the study of Corporate Governance. 
 
 
7.  A GOVERNANCE VIEWPOINT ON THE CASH-FLOWS COMPACT 
 
It is worth unfolding the main message contained in relationship (3): 
 
D D D D CF ( assets )   =   D D D DCF( creditors )   +  D D D DCF( owners )  +  
 
+   D D D DCF( senior management and directors )  +  D D D DCF( investment portfolio )   
 
On the left hand of this identity we find the source of expected value creation. On 
the right hand, we keep track of who are the main stakeholders contesting for the 
distribution of incremental cash flows, and also due regard is given to the so 
often neglected internal investment portfolio. 
 
From this viewpoint, the compact model stands as a benchmark against which 
we can monitor how those relevant players are getting along when carrying out 
their decision rights over cash flows.  
 
Why  did  creditors,  owners,  managers  and  directors  become  so  highly 
noticeable? At least, there are three reasons: 
 
a)  They are definitely the movers and shakers of any organization. In Anglo-
Saxon styles of governance, however, the role of creditors seems to be 
kept in the shadows in contrast with the paramount importance given to 
the others. But in German or Latin styles of governance, creditors are on 
equal foot with the other claimers
17.  
  
                                                 
17 Roe (2003) is a standard reference on this topic.   15 
b)  Conflicts of interest among owners, directors, managers and creditors are 
widespread and by far more persistent along time than the ones arising 
with or against other stakeholders
18. 
 
c)  Good relationships among the four players call for a covenant to manage 
their conflicts of interests. Such a covenant should be embedded into the 
founding  charter,  or  still  better,  in  the  Statute  of  Governance
19  that 










creditors’ safeguards.  
 
The  compact  model  also  points  out  to  a  darker  message.  There  are  many 
chances, even in well-framed governances, for opportunistic or arbitrary behavior 
with guile that could end up in the fraudulent handling of cash flows
20. 
 
7.1  DECISION RIGHTS 
 
Broadly speaking, by decision rights we understand those rights to effectively 
carry out decision-making and problem-solving processes.  
 
Narrowing down such meaning to the context of corporate governance, decision 
rights are those entitled to managers and the Board members by the founding 
charter and internal bylaws of the organization. They are brought into practice 
through  a  systematic,  persistent  and  rational  behavior  whose  main  outcome 
should be the attainment of the company’s primary goals. 
 
From the variegated sort of decision rights we single out those linked to cash 
flows.  In  point  of  fact,  an  impressive  amount  of  decision-making  becomes 
operational only when mastery over cash flows is truly granted. Such mastery 
shows two opposite dimensions: 
 
￿  a positive one which stems from governance principles;  
                                                 
18 Jensen-Smith (1985) seems a consequential paper to do research about conflicts of interests.  
19  Apreda  (2007a  )  was  among  the  first  to  stress  the  importance  of  this  statute  for  the 
improvement of corporate governance. 
20 The strong linkage between conflicts of interests and incremental cash flows can be tracked 
down to Apreda (2002b).   16 
￿  a  negative  one  that  evolves  when  good  practices  and  governance 
principles are trespassed. 
 
By far, this seems a topic that merits close examination, what falls within the 
scope of next subsection. 
  
7.2   DECISION RIGHTS OVER CASH FLOWS 
 
How could we profitably link the building blocks of cash flows and the four main 
categories developed in former sections, with the subject matter of Corporate 
Governance? Among other available ways, we choose here a linkage between 
any  cash  flow  as  a  constituent  in  each  building  block  portrayed  in  (3),  with 
decision rights claimed by some stakeholder over such constituents.     
 
D D D D CF ( owners )   
 
With the help of Exhibit 1, we can move on to itemizing the owners’ distinctive 




BUILDING BLOCK:    CASH FLOWS TO OWNERS 



















plus equity repurchase 
 
 


















the Board or the 
management 
 
owners or the Board 
 
In many countries where law enforcement and the compliance of the Constitution 
become hard to be enacted, family-owned companies usually resort to a large 
assortment  set  of  procedures  to  make  as  discretionary  the  handling  of  these 
cash  flows  as  to  damage  or  expropriate  other  stakeholders’  rights
21.  An 
outstanding  mechanism  consists  in  taking  advantage  of  the  so-called 
                                                 
21 Faccio et al. (2001) enlarge upon this issue.   17 
tunneling




But  in  those  governance  backgrounds  where  ownership  attains high  levels  of 
dispersal,  it  is  the  Senior  Management  who  can  devise  opportunistic 
mechanisms like the following: 
 
·  to steal owners from their cash flows,  
 
·  trigger off new equity issues to grant themselves the windfall of lenient stock 
options schemes,  
 
·  foster stock repurchases to get rid of contestant minorities,  
 
·  or increase their consumption of agency goods (new premises and corporate 
jets, travel rewards, and likewise fringe benefits or perks).  
 
Enron is a case in point that shows the extent to which bad governance practices 
can disgrace a company
24. 
 
D D D D CF ( creditors )    
 
Both global markets and the pervasive influence of institutional investors bring on 
consequential matters for cash flows to creditors (see Exhibit 2). At this juncture, 
the compact model becomes handy for checking out whether creditors profit at 
the expense of other stakeholders.  Namely,  board  composition,  short-termism 
and protective covenants. 
 
The first issue means that institutional investors or banks try and get Board’s 
representatives, whose main outcome consists of a new power design within the 




25, pressures from institutional investors constrain managers 
in their decision-making in such a way that they ultimately substitute financial 
myopia for sound judgement in their decision-making.  
 
Protective covenants in debt contracts usually convey tight budget constraints, 
but  also  restrain  strategic  decisions  that  impact  dividends,  new  debt  or  stock 
                                                 
22 More background in Friedman et al (2003).   
23 Some interesting remarks on pyramids are developed in Khana and Palepu (1999).  
24 On Enron, see Apreda (2002a). 
25  Demirag  (1998)  is  still  a  very  valuable  guide  to  appraise  short-termism  in  many  OECD 
countries.   18 
financing,  repurchase  of  debt  or  stock,  the  structure  of  incentives  and  the 





BUILDING BLOCK:    CASH FLOWS TO CREDITORS 

















Plus principal payments 
 
 
plus  debt repurchase 
 
 


















management or the Board 
 
 
management or the Board 
 
 
management or the Board 
 
 
owners, or the Board 
 
 
D D D D CF ( investment portfolio )   
 
In  Exhibit  3,  we  have  another  grouping  of  cash  flows  that,  when  used 
opportunistically, could prevent the company from attaining its primary goals and, 
furtherly, debasing the quality of its governance. Those cash flows arise out of 
any purchase or selling of financial assets that the company’s Treasurer carries 
out to build up an investment portfolio to meet two essential tasks:  
 
￿  to become a liquidity provider; 
￿  to hoard up resources for new growth opportunities. 
 
We must bear in mind that whereas securities purchased to build up this portfolio 
are financial assets for the company, they stand for liabilities from the issuers’ 
side. Hence, the column “cash flows categories” refer to that side. Last column, 
however, “decision rights over each constituent”, spells out who are the masters, 
as regards their decision rights within the company, to purchase those assets.  
                                                 
26 Smith and Warner (1979) were among the first to focus on Bond Covenants. 
27  In  some  countries,  Central  Banks  constrain  financial  institutions  to  stick  to  some  accrual 
mechanisms but forbid others.  
28 Whereas bullet bonds are fashionable in some countries, bonds which repay principal through 




BUILDING BLOCK:    INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO 



















































others: regulatory, residual, 
contractual 
 
















owners or the Board 
 
 
D D D D CF ( senior management and directors )   
 
We face here a building block whose nature is two-edged and pervasive:  
 
￿  its main upside consists in fostering the performance of both management 
and directors, granting stewardship, and keeping talent from deserting the 
company; 
 
￿  in  contradistinction,  its  downside  accounts  for  discretionary  power  over 
cash flows that could end up in outrageous consumption of agency goods 
or, still worse, shameless dealing and wheeling (Exhibit 4 summarizes the 
main issues).  
 
Many  governance  failures  eventually  stem  from  agency  costs,  that  is  to  say, 
costs arising from agency relationships. Some of them are positive, like incentive   20 
programs and perks
29. But negative agency costs lead to bad governance and 
worse performance. As Mark Roe (2003) has pointed out, they can be mapped 




BUILDING BLOCK:   CASH FLOWS TO MANAGEMENT AND DIRECTORS 


















plus  bonuses and 






rights, restricted stock, 
phantom stock) 
 
plus financial hybrids 
(convertible bonds, 
preferred convertible 
stock, bonds with 
warrants) 
 
plus retirement plans 
 
 


















































owners or the Board 
 
 




D D D D CF ( assets )    
 
The  most  debatable  items  in  this  building  block  lie  on  provisions  for  working 
capital and non-current assets. A conservative criterion should be to allocate only 
                                                 
29 Murphy (1998) reviewed the ups and downs of compensation packages; an updating is found 
in Hall and Murphy (2003). A provocative essay in the aftermath of corporate scandals is the book 
by Bebchuck and Fred (2004).   21 
cash  flows  required  for  maintenance  of  non-current  assets  and  reasonable 
amounts  of  money  to  meet  working  capital  needs.  However,  we  must  ask 
ourselves about the extent to which limits could be set. The Board must lay the 
foundations  for  any  increase  or  decrease  in  non-current  assets  and  working 
capital levels that could be regarded as sound decision-making for the period.   
 
By far, the building block of cash flows from assets is more variegated than the 
other four as Exhibit 5 brings home. This should not come as a surprise since 
above the Ebit line we find out an impressive number of revenue and costs items 




BUILDING BLOCK:    CASH FLOWS FROM ASSETS 


































minus D CF ( provisions 
to working capital ) 
 
minus  D  CF  (provisions 
to non-current assets) 
 
 
main: residual cash flows 
others: discretionary, 





















mostly on the side of the 
management, but there are 
decision rights contractually 
claimed by suppliers, 
customers, regulators and 
short-term finance providers 
 
the regulator gets decision 
rights, but the management 
can have a say when there is 
a choice of methodology or a 
fiscal subsidy 
 
claimed by management only 
when there is a choice of 
methodology 
 
mostly on the side of the 
management 
 
some decisions over fixed 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper intended to answer two distinctive questions: 
 
–  How many categories of cash flows do seem relevant, at least for handling 
distinctive  issues  arising  in  Corporate  Governance?  The  paper  shaped  up 
four  broad  categories:  contractual,  regulatory,  discretionary,  and  residual 
cash flows.   
 
–  How  do  categories  of  incremental  cash  flows  come  in  handy  from  the 
perspective of Corporate Governance?  
 
To answer the last question we have introduced, firstly, the compact model of 
incremental  cash  flows  that  consists  of  five  building  blocks,  one  for  each 
essential  player  in  the  governance  game:  owners,  directors,  managers  and 
creditors,  and  a  remaining  distinctive  building  block  that  deals  with  the 
investment portfolio. Secondly, we stressed that the key point lays on who has 
decision rights over the constituents of each building block of incremental cash 
flows. Such power may enable some stakeholder to claim unwarranted decision 
rights over cash-flow constituents making him better-off than the remaining lot, to 
the  extent  of  material  losses,  unfairness  or  even  expropriation  of  the  latter’s 
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THE INCREMENTAL CASH FLOW MODEL 
 
·  Assumptions 
 
planning horizon:    H  =  [ t; T ] 
   25 
valuation date:    at the beginning of the horizon.  
 
inputs:  ex~ante financial statements at T;  ex~post financial 
statements at t; ex~ante valuation of other variables. 
 
·  Building Blocks 
 
D CF ( assets )    =  D CF ( creditors )   +    D CF ( owners )     
 
·  The structure of building blocks 
 
1.   DCF (operations)    =    EBIT  –  taxes  +  depreciation  + amortization 
 
2.  DCF (assets)   =   DCF (operations)  –   
 
– provisions  for working capital – provisions for non-current assets 
 
3.  D CF (creditors)  = interest  +  principal repayment  +   
 
–  debt repurchase  –  new debt issue 
 
4.  DCF( owners )  = dividends + equity repurchase  –  new equity issue 
 
·  Toward the compact model 
 
D CF ( assets )    =  D CF ( assets; net )  –   
 
–   DCF( senior management and directors )  –  DCF( investment portfolio ) 
 
·  Notational assimilation 
 
D CF ( assets )    »  D CF ( assets; net ) 
 
·  The compact model 
 
D CF ( assets )    =  D CF ( creditors )   +    D CF ( owners )     
 
+    DCF( senior management and directors )  +  DCF( investment portfolio ) 
 
 
 